Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and In the second half of 1918, the Germans found themselves in a solely defensive scenario. Based on research on German offensives, the monograph analyzes operational thinking and the display of operational art in the subsequent defensive scenario from July 1918 to the armistice in November 1918. The paper follows two approaches. First, an analysis of primary sources to identify changes in the strategic context from a German perspective and derives implications for the German ability to apply operational art. Second, a reflection of German military actions upon a framework of operational elements, derived from a previous case study on the German offensives. The analysis confirms previous findings about German operational thinking, but also depicts limitations the Germans faced in their attempts to apply their thinking through military action. Those limitations emerged from significant changes in the operational environment in 1918. Current consensus is that the defense is a temporary form of warfare and military leaders always strive to seize the initiative to transit to the offensive form of war-fighting. The monograph questions the applicability of today's understanding of operational art in a purely defensive scenario and suggests the evolution towards a framework for operational art in the defense.
Introduction
I wrote in my diary: It was a dimmer fall morning at the beginning of the last quarter of the memorable year 1918. It will not be a year of "salvation," I am afraid, for us Germans, not even of inner sanctification. Disunity, the old German bad habit, is visible everywhere; political blindness, an externally orientated exaggerated cosmopolitism, internal factionalism captivate huge masses and thousands of thinking heads.
[…] The army could not keep itself away from these subversive influences. Fine words, an abundance of decorations, and encouragements of all kind came too late. 1 Max von Gallwitz, Experience in the West 1916 West -1918 With this entry in his personal war diary, written down in early October 1918, the German general Max von Gallwitz provided us his assessment and his outlook on the last few months of World War I (WWI). Just a few months prior, in the spring of 1918, German forces achieved limited success over the conduct of multiple offensive operations and hopes were high that Germany still could achieve victory over its enemies, but German commanders were unable to exploit this tactical success on an operational level. German forces culminated in their struggle to break the stalemate and re-establish maneuver centric warfare, and as a result, they transitioned to the conduct of "Abwehrschlachten" (defensive battles) against the advancing Allies, who seized the initiative. This period of the "Abwehrschlachten," from a German operational level perspective, is the subject of this monograph. To exemplify the defensive battle, the author uses actions of the German Army Group Gallwitz, who defended against the offensive campaign fought by the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) from September to November 1918 in the Meuse-Argonne sector of France.
The tendency of viewing WWI from the perspective of the offense characterizes the historical understanding of, not only the Meuse-Argonne campaign but, also almost the entire year of 1918. Besides the operational level case study of the German offensives in 1918 from David T. Zabecki, American literature about this period focuses predominately on Allied offensive operations from the perspective of the AEF. German WWI literature focuses predominately on political circumstances and social implications of the war rather than the analysis of battles or campaigns from an operational perspective.
A historical understanding of the German operational approach in the defense in which they countered the Allied offensive adds significantly to the overall knowledge of the Allied campaign in the Meuse-Argonne sector. By including an analysis of the German operational approach after culmination and transition to the defensive "Abwehrschlachten," the monograph provides detail for a more holistic perspective on the Allied campaign. Additionally, it develops an understanding of how the strategic context of Germany in the second half of 1918 influenced the application of operational art and the way the Germans thought, and enhances the overall understanding of the relationship between strategic context and operational art in a defensive scenario.
How did the Germans show operational level thinking and apply operational art during their purely defensive orientated "Abwehrschlachten," after the transition from the unsuccessful spring offensives, and which were the limiting factors in their struggle to counter the offensive operations of the Allies in 1918? Based on a comprehensive operational level case study of the pervious German offensives in 1918 by David T. Zabecki, this paper applies Zabecki's analytic framework to the subsequent German defensive operations from August to the armistice in November 1918.
According to Zabecki, the Germans thought operationally and displayed operational art during their spring offensives. The monograph analyzes the context of the "Abwehrschlachten" and the German defensive actions. It builds a case that despite their ability to think operationally in the offensive, the Germans lacked the ability to apply operational art to the same extent in the defense. The main reasons were limitations placed on the forces, which emerged from the significant changes in the strategic context in the second half of 1918. Those changes prevented the Germans from achieving the goals of a defense -to put oneself in a position of advantage from which the initiative can be seized and own forces transit to decisive, offensive operations again. 2 To support the analysis, the author uses the concept of operational from the United States Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, Change 1, published in February 2011, to explain the elements of operational art depicted in the "Abwehrschlachten." The analysis describes the manner in which the Germans thought operationally and displayed operational art during the conduct of the "Abwehrschlachten." The research relies on a number of primary German sources including battle and field reports, writings of officers who served in WWI as well as political leaders of that time. In addition, the author looked at primary American sources generated by the AEF, and other contemporary secondary sources, predominately about the campaign of the AEF, but also ones with a more general view on WWI.
After describing the development towards, and the conduct of the "Abwehrschlachten" through a literature review, the monograph will analyze the strategic context from a German viewpoint after the culmination of German forces in September 1918 -a result of the unsuccessful conduct of the German offensives. Changes in the strategic context played an important role in determining the level to which the Germans applied operational art in a purely defensive scenario. To support that analysis, the author uses a framework, described by Collin S.
Gray's in his book War, Peace, and International Relations. Gray asserts that context is vital to the understanding of wars. He further elaborates that the context in which wars happen comprises the political, the socio-cultural, the economic, technological, military-strategic, geographical, and the historical aspects of war. 3 In the main part of this monograph, the author explores the evolution of German military thinking and reflects the findings on the "Abwehrschlachten."
Using a modification of Zabecki's framework of the operational art, the monograph includes the evolution of German military theory and operational thinking. The author will do this by assessing the actions of the Germans in the defense to determine to what extent the "Abwehrschlachten" displayed operational art. A biographical review of General Max von Gallwitz, commanding general of the German Army Group Gallwitz, who opposed the AEF, provides additional insight in operational thinking on the German actions from the perspective of its senior commander.
To that end, the author will progress systematically through this framework with respect to the German "Abwehrschlachten" against the AEF's offensive campaign in the Meuse-Argonne sector in 1918. These findings, combined with the analysis of the context of strategic history, allow the author to describe the extent to which the actions within the "Abwehrschlachten" displayed operational art or to explain why not. Based on the findings of the analysis of the approach of the German forces opposing the AEF in the Meuse-Argonne sector, the monograph will describe the overall approach to the Allied fall offensive from an operational level perspective.
Establishing a Terminology
For the purpose of this monograph, some terms relevant to the discussion of the forces to achieve tasks that they derived from strategic plans, including the preparation, conduct, and sequencing of battles.
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Distinct from the operational art, the focus of operational thinking relies on the individual person and his ability to grasp, understand, and articulate the challenges that arise from gaps between tactical actions and strategic guidance in a large-scale conflict, spread over time as well as space. This requires the ability to zoom out and shift the focus away from single tactical actions to the linkage of those actions with respect to time and space aimed at a common end state. By doing so, one must be aware not to be too broad and hereby just repeat the strategy given in other terms.
For the purpose of analysis and assessment of operational art and thinking of German leaders during the "Abwehrschlachten" against the AEF, the author uses Zabecki's elements of operational design (center of gravity; decisive points; culmination; lines of operation; depth; timing; tempo and sequencing; and reach). Zabecki built this framework to analyze offensive operations, therefore the analysis of the German defensive operations in this monograph must assess first, if and then how each of the elements is applicable to the defensive scenario of the "Abwehrschlachten."
The Way to the German "Abwehrschlachten"
A German "Schützengrabengedicht" (trench poem), named "From the Trenches: The Brothers," written during the early WWI, begins with the line: "Man disappeared in the large army; the army disappeared in the soil." 9 This epitomizes in broad strokes the realization of the outcome of the Battle of the Marne in 1914 and the new stage of warfare the world was about to enter. The Germans were not able to achieve a decisive victory, which led to the onset of trench warfare in the west. Innovations led to improved trenches and barbed wire fortifications, rapidfire artillery and machine guns, which took away mobility from the battlefields. operations, the last one in mid-July, and they all failed to achieve decisive victories. In retrospect, causes for the German lack of success included decisions to reinforce unsuccessful troops that encountered strong enemy resistance rather than exploiting tactical achievements in other locations to reach success on the operational level. The penetration itself was the objective for the German offensive plans. The German Army Supreme Command, "Oberste Heeresleitung" (OHL), did not plan for branches or sequels addressing the opportunities given a penetration of the enemy's defensive positions.
12 Furthermore, Allied tactics evolved from a static to a mobile orientated defense to counter the German penetration tactics more effectively. After this series of offensives, Germany lacked the resources to conduct further attacks and the force ratio became a German disadvantage, due to the massive build-up of the AEF. German Crown Prince Rupprecht expressed his concern in mid-August 1918 that "The Americans are multiplying in a way we never dreamt of," and Ludendorff made the factual statement that Germany "cannot fight against the entire world." 13 With the launch of the Allied Meuse-Argonne-Offensive on September 26 in 1918, the German forces ultimately lost the initiative and they had to conduct a series of "Abwehrschlachten."
Culmination -The Allied Advance
Most historical reviews depict the Allied Meuse-Argonne-Offensive as a three-phased operation. This is consistent with a description General Pershing provided in his final report after WWI, in which he named the period from September 26 to October 3 as Phase I, Phase II started on October 4 and lasted until October 31, and the Phase III comprised the period from November 1 to 11. 14 12 Liddell Hart, The Real War, 1914 -1918 (Boston: Brown Little, 1930 , 370-374. The purpose of Phase II was to renew the attack and to drive the Germans from the heights east of the Meuse. By the end of the day, on October 7, the AEF had advanced an additional 6km, after encountering heavy German defenses. The Germans defended fiercely to gain time for the withdrawal of their troops from northern France further to the east, before the AEF could cut their lines of communication. Despite continuous fighting along the front line, the AEF launched another attack on October 14 and penetrated the Hindenburg Line, which was a system of linked fortified areas running from the North Sea to the area around Verdun in the middle of France. At the end of the phase, the AEF had forced the Germans to introduce a significant number of reserves (15 divisions) without being able to prevent an overall advance of the AEF of 21km.
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Phase III began with a two-hour artillery preparation and a subsequent infantry attack, which resulted in a 9km advance on November 1. The AEF penetrated the last German defensive line and captured the enemy's artillery positions. German forces retreated to avoid isolation.
Afterwards, Allied forces proceeded more easily towards Sedan and crossed the Meuse. On November 7, the area seized by the AEF extended 10km east of the Meuse River and Pershing's forces controlled the heights dominating Sedan, the ultimate objective of the operation. Shortly 15 Ibid., [46] [47] Ibid., 47-50. before the armistice on November 11, the AEF maintained complete control of the Meuse River line.
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In his operational level case study of these offensives, Zabecki concluded that the Germans showed through the conduct of their 1918 offensives that they had a clear understanding of the distinction between tactics and strategy and acknowledged the existence of the operational level in-between the two. By that time, Zabecki asserts, the Germans had a better grasp on operational thinking than any of their opponents. German army commanders fighting in the Meuse-Argonne sector grasped concepts like centers of gravity, decisive points, culmination, lines of operation, timing, and sequencing. They also had a good understanding of maneuver and deception at the operational level of war, and especially used operational fires in preparation of attacks. Furthermore, they started to learn about the operational implications of the concepts of depth and reach, as well as the importance of operational level intelligence and sustainment. In the interwar period, the Germans further developed those concepts, culminating in the military concepts and doctrines used by the Wehrmacht in World War II. Ludendorff promoted the idea to change the German government to a dictatorship, followed by a ruthless mobilization of all German resources. He believed a strong leader in charge of all means and resources could turn the situation in German favor. Therefore, he increasingly interfered with the government, undermined its credibility, and almost tried to gain absolute power towards the end of the war to become this dictator himself. In his "Kriegserinnerungen" or war memories, he elaborated on his impression of a weak German government and assessed that it was a failure of the government to state not clearly and emphatically in public that it was in charge and not him. Weltkriege 1914 -1918 (Imperial German Army 1914 , trans. C.F. Colton. (Berlin: Siegismund, 1937), 74. 21 Jacob Jung, Max von Gallwitz (1852 (Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1995), 93 & 97. 22 Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914 -1918 (Berlin: Mittler & Sohn, 1919 , 440.
General Max von Gallwitz became the commander of the newly established German
Army Group Gallwitz at the age of 65. Some critics depicted him as too old for war.
Nevertheless, he was one of the most experienced senior officers, which was a source of admiration from junior officers. Overall, contemporaries described von Gallwitz as an intelligent and diligent officer, very well educated, and one of the best commanders who understood his role and his obligations as a leader within the German Army. anticipated the future use of these technologies, even though it would take at least six more years before the Germans introduced the first automobiles into the Army. 25 These experiences related directly to operational fires and maneuver as well. Prior to WWI, Gallwitz commanded at different levels up to a division and became the Inspecting General of the German Army Artillery. 23 Jung, Max von Gallwitz (1852 Gallwitz ( -1937 , 5-7.
24 Ibid., [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] Ibid.,17-23. However, he recognized the potential of the new technologies. Above all, he was pleased with the progress of artillery units, which trained to provide accurate lethal fire without "Einschießen" or zeroing in first. 28 After the five German offensives failed to ensure victory, Gallwitz assessed that the war was lost.
The Germans were unable to organize sufficient resources to conduct at least two subsequent attacks and, because of that fact, the Allied force continued to grow almost unhampered. However, Gallwitz also argued that, instead of relying on a solely defensive strategy, the Army must conduct deliberate counterattacks into the flanks of the enemy's main attacks to defeat them. At the end of August 1918, Gallwitz saw no opportunity for the German forces to regain the initiative and concluded that defeat was inevitable. Expecting the attack of the AEF towards St. Mihel, Gallwitz ordered a withdrawal of his army group to the "Michelstellung" on 11 September 1918. One day later, the Allied offensive in the Meuse-Argonne sector began. [1916] [1917] [1918] 292 . "Einschießen" is a special form of indirect fire, especially used by artillery troops, when in lack of basic data for a precise calculation of the fire parameters. "Einschießen" can be conducted either on the target directly or on any another point, when the information about the relative position of that point in relation to the target is known. If the guns are zeroed on that point, the required fire parameters to hit the target can be calculated and fire can be shifted from the other point onto the target precisely. This procedure costs time and gives the enemy a warning. The new procedure enables artilley troops to skip the process of "Einschießen" and engage the target directly and precisely. 29 Jung, Max von Gallwitz (1852 Gallwitz ( -1937 , 93-100. 30 Gallwitz wrote two comprehensive works about his actions and these lessons learned as a senior commander during WWI. The first one covered the war from 1914 to 1916 in Belgium, on the Eastern Front, and in the Balkans. The second book, Erleben im Westen 1916 -1918 (Experience in the West 1916 -1918 , used in this monograph, described his experiences on the Western Front from 1916 to 1918. the operational level of warfighting and its implications. However, the ability to think operationally does not ensure success on its own. War does not happen isolated, it is embedded in context, and this context might set limitations to operational actions -despite the presence of operational thinking.
The Strategic Context of the German "Abwehrschlachten"
The war took too long. Enthusiasm cannot be conserved for any length of time. In addition, equanimity and the willingness to make sacrifices will be questioned over the time, especially, if a nation is led towards starvation through "Abschließungsgetriebe (?)" and blockades. Time was not working for us -it was against us. Only action could change something, could be decisive. The wait led to equanimity, to discontent. It is not surprising at all that bustling minds, leading politicians started to doubt about our competence and about the skills of the appointed military leaders and believed, to be allowed to interfere in a helping and mediating manner at certain times. Our political headship was too weak to keep things firmly under control and to lead. Gallwitz, Erleben im Westen 1916 -1918 This quote is from the chapter on final considerations, where Gallwitz elaborates on the course of the war. "Der Krieg dauerte zu lange. Begeisterung lässt sich nicht beliebig konservieren. Aber auch Gleichmut und Opferwilligkeit werden auf die Dauer in Frage gestellt, besonders wenn ein Volk durch Abschließungsgetriebe und Blockade dem Hunger entgegengeführt wird. Die Zeit arbeitete nicht für uns -sie war gegen uns. Nur die Tat konnte ändern, konnte entscheiden. Das Warten führte zur Gleichgültigkeit, zum Mißmut. Es ist nicht zu verwundern, daß geschäftige Geister, führende Politiker an unserem Können oder an der Geschicklichkeit der berufenen Führer zu zweifeln begannen und glaubten, bei Zeiten helfend und vermittelnd eingreifen zu dürfen. Unsere politische Leitung war zu schwach, um die Zügel fest in der Hand zu behalten und selbst zu führen." negotiated agreement was fragile and a half a million of German soldiers stayed as an occupation force, this victory allowed the Germans to focus the bulk of their remaining forces in a sequence of decisive offensive operations -the German 1918 offensives -on the western front.
Nevertheless, the continuous Allied reinforcement soon led to culmination and the necessity to switch to solely defensive operations. The fact that the German had nearly used all their resources by that time -man, as well as material -reinforced and accelerated this development. Without sufficient resources, Germany was in no longer position to seize the initiative from the attackers.
The following described changes in the context led to an environment that denied the Germans offensive actions, which are an important element of defensive wars, as Clausewitz explains in his book on defense. He elaborates that "pure defense would be completely contrary to the idea of war" and "[one] must return the enemy's blows" by "offensive acts in a defensive war." The OHL continuously interfered with political affairs and tried to reject the responsibility for the imminent defeat. 35 This power struggle resulted in ambiguous guidance and hampered consistent military planning, but it was not the only challenge emerging towards the end of the war. The war support of the civilian population started to break away.
An Exhausted and Demoralized Home Front
The German population supported the war fiercely after it began and, despite the fact that there was no quick victory and the war extended roughly four more years, they continuously supported the war efforts. The society incurred tremendous sacrifices and burdens because of the war, above all the death of millions of relatives and friends on the battlefields. Some estimates highlighted that starvation, not only caused about half a million deaths during the period of the British naval blockade but, also created the willingness among the citizens to postpone interGerman social conflicts after the war. Propaganda efforts created and fostered the belief that Germany still could achieve peace through a decisive victory by the military. Ultimately, the attempt to achieve an armistice busted this bubble and the willingness to support the war within the population broke away quickly. The immediate termination of the war without any further bloodshed became priority number one, once citizens came to the realization that all efforts, deprivations, and sacrifices of the past four years had been pointless.
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The German society was exhausted and demoralized. The initial war fever of [1914] [1915] [1916] vanished without a trace. Food shortages became the driving factor for resistance to the war and the military, industrial firms, and municipalities competed for the remaining limited resources. As a result, strikes became more common and people demanded immediate peace, improvements in the food supply, the release of political prisoners, and the end of the military control of parts of society. This made an already dire situation, in terms of resources necessary for the further conduct of the war, even worse. This ultimately culminated in a decision by the German leadership to use the army against its own population to break the strikes. To counter the threat of a negative impact on the troops from societal discontent, propaganda efforts against anti-war agitation increased. As an example, the chief of the naval general staff alleged in a secret document to subordinate commands, dated September 30, 1918 , that the severity of the current situation forced them to leave no remedy untried. He instructed officers to utilize every opportunity to increase, or at least uphold, morale among the soldiers and whenever possible, of the population as well. These instructions explained how officers should interact with soldiers and citizens in trains, transporting exhausted troops to short leaves in their home areas. The document advised officers to travel in civil attire and to cut in on every antiwar conversation. It provided them with arguments designed to counter antiwar comments as well as questions aimed at the people and low ranking soldiers. 
Soldiers and Civilians Compete for Resources
The German Empire evolved during the industrial revolution from an agrarian-oriented to an industrialized economic power alongside Great Britain and the United States. By the end of WWI, the average income per citizen doubled when compared to the income at the time of the foundation of the German Empire in 1871. However, many people perceived their personal economic situation as bad because the average income in 1918 was almost equal to the level of 1895. Regardless of the fact that the German Empire gained significant economic power throughout its existence, WWI destroyed the economic achievements of an entire generation.
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Owing to the prolonged nature of the war, resources shifted from the civil-side to the military.
This comprised, for example, about one million draft animals, which the military took away from farmers to pull logistic wagons and artillery pieces. That also meant that the military became the priority for fodder supply. Additionally, the draft of agricultural workers into the military contributed to the deterioration of the agricultural production. Attempts to substitute these missing workers with the aid of females and POWs did not prove successful. The decreased use of fertilizer by 50 percent over the course of the war suggests the impact of this action. 39 The war not only reduced the amount of resources German companies produced, it also created the requirement for substitute products for the goods that merchants usually imported to German 40 Burhop, Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Kaiserreichs 1871 -1918 produced insufficient results. This led to a credit financing with war bonds, which failed because of insufficient revenues collected through the sales. During the last year of the war, German war related expenses counted 50 billion Reichsmark, eleven times more than in the last year of peace before the outbreak of WWI. In an effort to provide enough money for the government to sustain the war efforts, German banks printed more money, which resulted in rapidly growing inflation as of summer 1917. After that, German economic policy became inefficient and almost non-existent.
Solving immediate economic crises dominated political actions at the expense of the development and implementation of economic long-term concepts. In the last months of the war, German industry anticipated an imminent military decision that would result in the end of the fighting and shifted its production partially to peacetime conditions, which led to a further reduction of resources available for military purposes.
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In a letter to the Chancellor of the Reich, Ludendorff shared his concerns about the sharp deterioration of the economy and the interplay between prices and wages and their influence on the workers. He pointed out the significant increase of clothing prices, which exceeded by far every maximum price fixing and made clothing even for middle class people unaffordable.
Additionally, these conditions created a weird situation on the labor market. As Ludendorff stated, some critical workers receives such high wages that there was no incentive to work.
Hedonism increased instead and the focus of the workers laid more on spending their money.
Sometimes they had celebrations spanning over days. However, employers could not fire them, because there was a significant shortage of workers on the labor market. Workers also attempted to demonstrate less productivity to prevent any additional withdrawal of workers to the battlefields, which led overall to a heavy decline in productivity, up to 60 percent of the regular level. Ludendorff assessed the developments as a threat to German national security and suggested countering them by all available means. 42 The competition for resources between the military and the civil society and the tensions between the government and the civilian workforce ultimately resulted in a further decrease of productivity and reinforced shortage of resources. This situation did not only affect the people -civilians as well as soldiers -it also hindered the production of sufficient numbers of new weapons advancing the battlefields, needed to support the overall defense with well-coordinated offensive actions, coordinated in time, space, and purpose, and geared towards seizing the initiative. Kampfwagen greifen an!, German crews developed confidence in their tanks. Besides some issues, like the mobility on very muddy terrain, overheating engines, and its limited capability to cross trenches wider than 2 meters, the A7V models prevailed in battle. 46 Nevertheless, the small number of available A7V, 20 systems, employed in combat operations provided no significant influence on the outcome of the war, when compared to the 381 British tanks utilized in the attack at Cambrai alone. 47 On the other side, the Germans employed more advanced artillery pieces than the Allied had at their disposal. Additionally, the way the Germans used artillery, following the newly developed guidelines by Colonel Georg Bruchmüller, proved far more effective. However, the Allies would ultimately succeed based on their superior numbers. 48 The tactical aspects of warfare focus more on finding a technological solution to a specific tactical problem. To achieve the aims of a war, a strategy must guide the use of these new technologies and hereby gear this usage towards a common goal. Additional challenges emerged when the German war goals shifted at a pace and in a direction, with which strategy could not keep up.
The Challenges of Technical Advances and Availability

Military-Strategic Changes Alter the War Aim
Three elements characterize the military-strategic context of the Abwehrschlachten. First, the nature of the war changed from a two-front war to a war solely fought on the western front. However, the Germans lacked the ability to relocate all their forces from the eastern to the western front, as they had to guard the fragile peace with occupation forces in the gained eastern territories. At least the fighting in the east stopped. 49 Second, the Germans depleted a large part of their resources, leaving insufficient reserves to execute promising attempts to regain the initiative.
Germany was on the defense and, even though General Gallwitz advocated counter-attacks as part of the defensive battle, he knew that he lacked the resources to do so successfully. The entire military effort, and therefore the operational planning, had to occur in a pure defensive mindset. Germany had to determine the outcome of the war by military action, which meant they had to keep the forces in the fight, and try to defeat the French and British armies before the arrival of the AEF. 51 The three continental war parties literally put Germany in a clinch. After Germany defeated Russia to the east, France remained to the west and England to the north-west.
The Challenges of Occupying the Center Stage and a Common History
As Gray asserts, the geographical location of an entity or nation significantly influences the interaction with its neighbors. Going further, he argues that the characteristics of the natural landscape shape political actions as well. Hart, The Real War, 1914 -1918 implement an effective naval blockade, with the desired effect on the German society and subsequently on the forces. While Gray asserts that, nearly all politicians and soldiers at the time of the outbreak of WWI lacked a realistic imagination of what modern warfare, given the technological opportunities and the size of mass armies, would look like. By 1918, reality had caught up with them. 54 This did not necessarily mean that leaders possessed the ability to draw the right conclusions from the impressions the modern war made on them. For example, after the German counter-offensive at Cambrai, in which storm troops regained more than half the ground the British had taken through their tank attack, Ludendorff for example maintained the impression that the infantry achieved a complete victory. Therefore he, and as a consequence the OHL, neglected to accept the potential of the newly employed weapon system on the battlefield -the tank -at this point of the war. 55 Furthermore, this misperception and the resulting failure to produce and employ tanks to counter enemy tanks started to undermine the faith of the troops in their generalship.
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Operational Art and the German "Abwehrschlachten" in 1918
With the beginning of the "Abwehrschlachten," Germany was not pursuing the same goals, as it did when the war broke out and the desired outcome for the war shifted towards the acceptance of an unavoidable end state. Looking at the conditions after the unsuccessful German 1918 offensives, Germany lost the war, even though the Allies never administered the German Clausewitz's statement that the outcome of a war is never final. As an inversion of his argument, the end state in a conflict cannot always be determined at the beginning. The ultimate end state in a war is to compel an enemy to do one's will and to make the enemy defenseless.
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While at the beginning of WWI the perception of a war of defense was predominant in Germany, the initial success augmented the war aims to a more ambitious war of annexation. perceived the treaty as a sign that it could achieve a solely military victory in the west as well.
Since the outbreak of the war in 1914, German politics operated on the assumption that the future of Germany's domestic institution was inseparable from the military outcome of the conflict. This perception almost blocked internal political decisions and fed the will to continue the war in the west until one of the sides capitulated. Ludendorff, who constantly tried to militarize the German domestic politics, prepared to achieve a decisive victory in the west as well. 61 With the necessity to switch to solely defensive operations on the western front, the end state for the military operations shifted as well. Following Zabecki's findings that the Germans showed a developed understanding of how to link tactical actions in time, space, and purpose during their large-scale offensive operations, the question is how they were able to transfer these skills to the emerging defensive scenario.
Defeating the Enemy Before he Becomes Effective
While FM 3-0 describes the center of gravity as the "source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act," 62 Clausewitz orients himself with his description more at the idea of a center of gravity in physics. He describes it as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends." 63 In book six on defense, Clausewitz explains that the center of gravity is where the mass of a force is concentrated and from where the heaviest blow towards the enemy originates. 64 With an overall number of 2,084,000 American soldiers, of whom 1,390,000 saw active service at the front lines, the AEF was clearly a mass of force from which decisive action could be undertaken towards the Germans. The introduction of the AEF into the battles shifted the ratio of the rifle strength from an advantage on the German 61 Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918, 158-165. 62 Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-0 Operations, 7-30.
63 Howard und Paret, Carl von Clausewitz: On War, [595] [596] Ibid., 485-486. side to the Allies, who by November exceeded the German number by 600,000. 65 In hindsight,
Ludendorff stated in his war memories that the attempts to compel the nations of the Entente through German victories to accept peace before the American reinforcements arrived failed. 66 The fact that General Pershing in his final report also assessed the AEF as a central element of
Allied strength supports the German perception of the potential of the fresh forces. Pershing elaborated that American forces with a determined purpose joining the fight would significantly affect German morale and prestige. One the other hand, the early arrival of the AEF ensured a boost to the morale of the Allied partners. 67 If the Germans could have forced the British and the French into separate peace agreements, as they achieved one with the Russians on the Eastern front, before the AEF joined the fight, they would have shortened the war and reduce the negative effects on Germany. Following these thoughts, the Allied Center of Gravity from a German perspective shifted towards the AEF, even before it became effective on the battlefields. Because of resource limitations, the Germans were in no position to attack the Center of Gravity effectively with a direct approach. It was also unlikely that the German forces could have defeated the AEF through attrition. The only chance Germany had was to render the AEF ineffective, before it became combat ready -an indirect approach. They tried to do that through their 1918 offensives.
Gaining Time is Decisive During the Defense
In general, Clausewitz describes a decisive point as a location where one brings as many troops as possible into the fight, to seek a decision. Especially in the absence of absolute superiority, like in the case of the German "Abwehrschlachten" against the Allies, the Germans tried to employ their available forces with such a skill, that they would have been able to achieve at least relative superiority at the decisive point. 68 FM 3-0 expands this view and asserts that besides a geographical location, a decisive point can also be a specific key event, critical factor, or a function that allows commanders to gain an advantage and ultimately to defeat the enemy. At the operational level, decisive points lead to the enemy's Center of Gravity, through an operational approach. From a defensive perspective, prevailing at decisive points puts oneself in a position to regain the initiative. The following exploitation comes very likely along with a transition to the offense. 69 Zabecki stated that there was a misunderstanding of the term decisive point during the "early period of operational reawakening in the West." 70 Looking at the basic ideas of Clausewitz, a decisive point is more like a point of main effort or "Schwerpunkt," where a military leader masses his forces to seek a decision. Zabecki related a quote from Hindenburg, who stated that an operation without a "Schwerpunkt" is like a man without character. 71 Looking at the German defensive operations and their application of the principles of building a "Schwerpunkt," they had no other opportunity to put the bulk of their forces against the anticipated main effort of the Allies. Without the resources to conduct successful counterattacks, the decision where to place the "Schwerpunkt" was on the German side reactive rather than characterized by initiative. Following the notion that the principle of a decisive point is driven by initative and therefore more applicable to offensive operations, it is not surprising that Clausewitz does not use the term "decisive point" throughout his entire book on the defense, book six. As
Zabecki explains, the Germans knew about the concept of decisive points and applied it in an appropriate manner throughout their offensive campaigns. 72 The lack of resources to conduct 68 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, [195] [196] Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-0 Operations, 7-48 to 7-51. offensive operations within their "Abwehrschlachten" and the significant numerical superiority of the Allies made it almost impossible for the Germans to apply this principle in an active manner, rather than in reactive one. Early September 1918, General Gallwitz proposed to conduct a spoiling attack from positions near St. Mihel against the AEF, rather than just to fall back into the next defensive line, the "Michel Stellung." The Germans believed that the AEF was preparing for an upcoming Allied offensive on Metz, but when a few days later intelligence adjusted the Allied objective to St. Mihel itself, the Germans assessed the planned attack to be unfeasible and cancelled it. 73 This attack would have been a decisive point.
Looking from a perspective of FM 3-0, some of the German actions followed the idea of a decisive point being a key event or a critical factor, rather than a geographical force 
If You Cannot Win, Keep Your Forces in the Fight to Avoid Defeat
After the fifth offensive in 1918, the Germans did not have sufficient resources to maintain offensive operations. Gallwitz convinced Ludendorff that at least two additional 73 Jung, Max von Gallwitz (1852 offensives would be necessary to achieve a decision over the Allies. Throughout the planning process and with time marching on, they realized that the available artillery was not sufficient to support these attacks and Allied advances fixed more of the German forces. When given the situation at the frontlines, thought that the Germans could ever seize the initiative again.
The constant withdrawal after culminating in a defensive line was not a promising approach.
Gallwitz journalized that the initiative was completely on the side of the Allies. 79 The Germans only chance for, was to keep up the defense until the winter 1918. The OHL assessed, that the 76 Jung, Max von Gallwitz (1852 , 94-95.
77 Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914 -1918 , 547. August 8 in 1918 , the start of the final Allied offensive, was named by Ludendorff as the black day of the German Army. The Allies achieved a penetration of the German positions in the battle of Amiens and hereby forced the Germans to withdraw on a large scale. Even though the Germans were able to stabilize the situation and slow down the Allied advance on the following day, the Allied success at Amiens was a blow to German morale. German defeat was inevitable, not at least due to the massive numerical superiority of the Allies, increasing constantly along with the AEF force build-up. 78 Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 3-0 Operations, 7-85. 79 Jung, Max von Gallwitz (1852 Gallwitz ( -1937 Allied would not continue their offensive operations throughout the winter, which meant that the Germans could recover until the revival of the Allied offense in spring 1919. This possibility of a breathing spell, as named by Ludendorff, did from a German perspective not only entail the opportunity to prolong own culmination, but also a chance to force and exploit Allied culmination. The Germans assessed the Allied lines of communication as overextended. There was a small window of opportunity to exploit that situation to moderate the terms of an armistice.
In his post-war analysis, General von Kuhl concludes that on the day of the armistice the British lines of communications had reached their maximum of extension. He supports his statement by the fact that the British needed six days after the armistice to resume their advance, which they were only able to conduct with less than one-third of their force. 80 The Germans understood the principle and the implications of culmination, but given the limitations in means, they were neither able to prevent their own culmination in the defense, nor impose culmination on the 88 Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational Level of War, 27 & 34. 89 Ibid., [321] [322] [323] act freely. The overwhelming force of the Allied dictated the timing and tempo on the defenders, while the Germans had no choice other than to shape the battlefield than through retreat and occupying deeper defensive positions. By defending as long as possible in one position and prolonging the withdrawal to the next position, the Germans had a limited opportunity to influence the tempo. In an offensive operation, tempo generally aims at overwhelming the enemy through rapid action.
90 At the beginning of the "Abwehrschlachten," the German military leaders assessed that it is unfeasible to impose their will upon the Allies by the conduct of purely defensive actions. However, with no resources and means at hand to regain the initiative, the only chance of mitigating the effects of a defeat from a German perspective was to slow down the operational tempo of the Allies as much as possible. With this approach, the Germans intended to paralyze the Allied will through fierce defenses gradually, rather than breaking it.
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The Challenge of an Increased Battlefield Decreases During the Defense
In general, the conduct of an "Abwehrschlacht," especially against an overwhelming enemy, serves the purpose to trade time for space. The defending forces retreats continuously and hereby the distance for supply or reinforcement decreases, as the troops withdraw closer to their headquarters' command post and supply facilities. Understanding operational reach, as the distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities," 92 the only means the Germans had to do so, with respect to combat power, was the artillery. obscured political guidance with respect to strategic aims of the war. Ultimately, it was more a struggle to establish a narrative of whom to blame for the inevitable German defeat.
The most decisive factor influencing the operational freedom of the forces were the deteriorating situation on the German home front and the associated decreased effectiveness of the industry. These developments affected the forces on the front lines in a way that hampered the German application of operational art in a promising manner. During 1918, especially after the German offensives failed to achieve victory over the Allied forces, and furthermore depleted a large amount of German resources -man as well as material -the initial war enthusiasm of the German population turned into open rejection. This culminated in the revolutionary movement shortly before the armistice. Additionally, the struggle for resources between the military and the civil society prevented commanders from employing forces in a number and manner, they would need to regain the initiative. The situation was a vicious circle. On the one hand, the military needed a constant flow of supplies, ammunition, weapons, tanks, and other equipment, but
Germany withdrew the workers needed to produce the materiel for war from the production facilities to replace the significant losses in the German troop formations. When the war finally affected the population on a large scale, through growing inflation, a shortage of food and clothing, as well as the need to feed more and more man into the war machine, resentment towards German war efforts grew. Given these conditions, the Germans were unable neither to replace their losses, nor to allocate sufficient resources to the production of new advanced weapon systems like tanks. Nevertheless, especially tanks, as well as motorized means of transportation, proved crucial to apply operational art in a defense with the aim to regain the initiative. However, by that time, Germany was exhausted.
The analysis, based on the framework of operational art, delivers two findings. One the one side it provided an assessment of the application of operational thinking reflected in German military actions. On the other hand, it appears that the concept of operational art, as stated in the introduction, is predominately build around offensive actions. Even though Clausewitz named the defensive as the stronger form of warfare, military commanders always compete over the initiative. Offensive operations are decisive. This is depicted in the language Clausewitz used, as in the language of today`s military doctrines. 95 By analyzing a solely defensive type of warfighting, the German "Abwehrschlacht," the language of operational art appeared not to match the conditions of the defensive, as well as it applies to the offensive. By analyzing other predominantly defensive scenarios, a framework for operational art in the defense with the respective elements of operational art in the defense could be developed, following the discussion about lines of operations and lines of retreat in the section "Operational Art and the German "Abwehrschlachten" in 1918.
The analysis of the military actions using the framework of operational art and the elements of operational art with more offensive character shows that German military commanders knew about the importance to attack the enemy's center of gravity. They also knew that, given the conditions at that time, they would have to use an indirect approach. The plan aimed at forcing France and Britain into separate peace agreements by decisive offensive operations before the AEF arrived on the European battlefields. After this goal was not met, any plan to attack the enemy's Center of Gravity -the AEF -appeared unfeasible. In a purely defensive scenario, the benefit of knowing the enemy's Center of Gravity helps to identify his intended axis of attack and to set up effective defenses, rather than acquiring targets and objectives for own strikes against it.
Thinking through decisive points, German military commanders possessed the ability to decide where to fight, by choosing effective defensive positions. Intelligence assessments, determining where the next Allied attack might occur, were the predominant factor when determining decisive points. Germany was on the defense and that meant the forces reacted rather 95 Headquarters Department of the Army, ADP 3-0 Unified Land Operations (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2011), 1. According to ADP 3-0 the purpose of operations is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage. than being proactive. Therefore, the idea of decisive points forming a line from one's own base towards an objective related to the enemy was not applicable for German commanders in this defensive scenario. The concept of lines of operations seemed unsuitable for a defensive scenario as well. With those lines pointing towards their own nation, rather than an objective in the territory of the enemy, the German lines of communication, or in this case the interior lines, became shorter with every withdrawal of forces to the next defensive position. Because of the conditions present, the Germans were unable to address decisive points, reach, timing, and sequencing, as well as lines of operations, even though they knew about them and followed those principles throughout their offensive. In a defensive scenario, as mentioned above, a construct like a "line of retreat" synchronizing time and space among defending and withdrawing forces, rather than a line of operation, orientated along geographic locations leading towards an objective or even the Center of Gravity can help commanders planning their defenses. 96 A line of retreat would not be geared towards the enemy's Center of Gravity. Its purpose is to make the striking power of the enemy's force less effective, at best rendering it ineffective.
The Germans knew that they had culminated in the offensive and defeat was inevitable.
Nevertheless, to avoid the devastating culmination in the defensive, the Germans attempted to impose culmination on the advancing Allies. The basic idea to force Allied culmination through a series of time-consuming fierce defensive battles with high casualties that resulted in paralyzing the Allied will, rather than breaking it, showed the sequencing of tactical actions in time and space geared towards a common goal. This meets contemporary basic definitions of operational art.
The overarching theme, which limited German military commander's application of operational art, resulted from the shortage of resources. Germany fired its last bullets with five 96 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, [391] [392] unsuccessful offensives from March to August 1918 and from that point, the countdown to defeat was inevitable. After the black day of the German Army, this was no secret to anyone.
"The 8th of August gave proof of the decline in our striking power and deprived me of the hope, considering the state of our replacement situation, of finding a strategic remedy which would again consolidate the situation in our favor … The war had to be terminated." Furthermore, the need to conduct "Abwehrschlachten" led to a refined elastic defensivein-depth and besides initial success in World War II, German military commanders soon found themselves again involved in "Abwehrschlachten," desperately trying to avert or at least delay the inevitable defeat. Since the rearmament of Germany in 1956, the foundation of the "Bundeswehr," delay operations and mobile defense against an overwhelming conventional force, with offensive operations being an integral part rather than an individual type of warfare, were the two forms of warfighting the forces trained to conduct. Further research overarching the evolution from the WWI defense-in-depth to the NATO defense plans in the Fulda-gap would enhance the understanding of operational art in the defense.
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